This week, Britain’s media will understandably be poring over every cough and splutter of the UK–EU summit. But the other leaders’ meeting, in Shenzhen, China, could well do more to shape the trading environment for British businesses.
Photographs of Xi Jinping, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin altogether in conversation are both remarkable and sobering. The stated aims of reducing nuclear risk and creating greater trade predictability are objectives we should all support, but whether these talks deliver substance beyond the rhetoric is another question.
Xi’s speech at the APEC CEO Summit followed a well-established Chinese geopolitical narrative: a choice between openness and cooperation, or protectionism and isolation. He defended the multilateral trading system, with the World Trade Organisation(WTO) at its centre, and called for fewer trade and investment barriers, greater market access, innovation and a faster green transition. He acknowledged turbulence while projecting confidence, citing official domestic growth of 4.6% over the first three quarters and promising lower tariffs and further opening up of the Chinse economy.
I look at this as Beijing presenting itself as a dependable global commercial partner in an increasingly unpredictable world. But the promises must stand up to commercial reality, and I would certainly take that growth headline with a pinch of salt.
From a British business perspective I think we can apply a straightforward test of accountability: will China actually remove trade and investment barriers, expand market access and make approvals easier? Will foreign companies find it easier to compete fairly? Those are the tests that will distinguish an true ‘opening up’ from just another speech.
Xi also proposed a “World Association for Bay Areas Economic Cooperation”. I suspect it will amount to very little without clear membership, resources or practical commitments. Another organisation will not, by itself, resolve the restrictions businesses already face.
However, the larger institutional problem is real. The Bretton Woods institutions have been creaking for years, and the wider trading system urgently needs reform. We should modernise the IMF and World Bank and restore confidence in the WTO’s rules and dispute settlement. The WTO ministerial conference in Yaoundé, earlier this year, highlighted just how difficult it has become to build consensus in an increasingly fragmented trading environment. For countries like the UK, functioning institutions offer greater protection than bargains struck between the largest powers, such as the Big Three leaders in Shenzhen. We need reform of the system rather than a new one.
I expect governments to be selective in their response. Washington can pursue a more stable relationship while maintaining technology controls. The EU will look for reciprocal access and fair competition. Its ‘Made in Europe’ proposals make this a live issue for Britain too; closer cooperation should strengthen shared supply chains, not create fresh barriers for UK suppliers. But a warmer EU summit atmosphere will not settle those arguments.
The photographs of the three leaders will dominate coverage. But the more consequential commercial story, with potentially far bigger ramifications, is the integration of supply chains across China and Southeast Asia.
The upgraded China–ASEAN trade agreement takes effect on Tuesday 1 December, alongside a push to connect infrastructure, standards, digital trade and industrial supply chains.
The strategic logic is smart and commercially powerful, manufacturing can move outside China while remaining connected to Chinese components, technology and production networks. ASEAN countries retain their own interests and choices, but greater regional integration could make China more central even as factories spread geographically.
As ‘economic resilience’ becomes more embedded in the UK business lexicon, and firms attempt to diversify their suppliers, many roads will still lead back to China. A contract with a factory in Vietnam may appear to reduce exposure but in reality it leaves critical dependencies intact. Businesses need to understand the suppliers, technology and inputs behind their immediate supplier. Changing a factory’s address is not, by itself, a resilience strategy.
Therefore, I would say we should immediately explore the opportunities for British businesses, particularly in the Industrial Strategy sectors where we have global competitiveness. British engineering, health technology, finance and services supporting cleaner industry could find customers across this increasingly connected region.
So as our leaders meet in Europe to deepen ties, they should look carefully at the pictures from Shenzhen. They should sharpen the focus on closer coordination over economic security and trade. Closer trading ties are critical. Neither the UK nor the EU belongs to APEC, so our absence is not a concern, but decisions taken there will affect businesses and economies across Europe.
Britain’s G20 presidency in 2027, followed by the G7 in 2028, gives us a rare opportunity. China understands how to combine high-level diplomacy with a demonstration of industrial capability. Shenzhen is part of the message. We should learn from that and put our businesses, universities, cities and financial expertise at the centre of our hosting years. We should use the G20 to build wider agreement and carry practical commitments into our G7 year. Digital trade, AI, regulatory cooperation and investment partnerships are areas where Britain should aim to set the agenda. Chambers and businesses should help shape those priorities from the outset.
Brussels is the European story of the week, Shenzhen is the global one. British business cannot afford to ignore either. Our success will be measured by what the we can achieve afterwards that we could not before. All subject, of course, to Donald Trump’s next Truth Social post.