Following all the fears beforehand, it’s genuinely remarkable how well Donald Trump’s recent State Visit went and, perhaps more surprisingly, how much he seems to like the UK. Through a mix of astute diplomacy and a little luck, Britain has ended up in a stronger position with Washington than almost any other ally. However, we mustn’t confuse the theatre of Trump’s unprecedented second State Visit with delivery.
Because that’s what now counts, the forward-looking strategy must be all about delivery, which is far harder than making announcements. The State Visit has generated headlines on handshakes and big tech deals, but symbolism doesn’t shift tariffs, fix quotas, or build grid connections. In 2025, our competitiveness won’t be won or lost in banqueting halls but in planning offices, customs queues, and whether UK businesses can trade across borders without drowning in red tape.
At the French Institute roundtable last week, sitting alongside Sir Robin Niblett and Sam Lowe, I set out to discuss UK–US trade and where Europe fits. But we ended up talking about power, who has it, who is losing it, and whether the UK still knows how to play the game. The uncomfortable truth is this: trade is about trade-offs. The USA is now transactional, Europe is defensive, and unless the UK gets serious about delivery, it risks becoming a spectator in its own economic future.
The ‘Special Relationship’ is strong, but conditional
The ‘special relationship’ still matters, deeply. On the surface, the numbers show resilience. The US remains the UK’s single largest services partner, with £198 billion in bilateral trade last year. Investment ties are even deeper, £1.4 trillion in bilateral stock stretching across finance, insurance, tech and pharmaceuticals. Major announcements during Trump’s visit, particularly around AI, data centres and finance, reaffirmed that the UK remains a launchpad for US capital.
Yet scratch beneath the headlines and the picture hardens. The 40,000 UK firms trading goods with the US face stubborn frictions: tariffs on steel and aluminium, de-minimis product thresholds in flux, quotas on autos, disputes over pharmaceuticals and timber. This is the quiet shift, though nothing is ever truly quiet with President Trump! The relationship is durable, but it’s no longer a ‘free ride’. Washington’s politics are transactional; goodwill alone doesn’t lower barriers. If the UK wants access and growth, we must be useful, predictable and investable.
The State Visit gave both governments their optics: the pageantry, the nostalgia, the President inspecting the King’s Guard, and a Prime Minister keen to show a tangible trade win after months of quiet, pragmatic diplomacy. It was, in truth, a smart political play, after weeks of criticism and a summer of awkward optics, including the President’s headline-grabbing golf holiday in Scotland where the Prime Minister appeared somewhat sidelined. But what has actually shifted?
The Technology Prosperity Deal could become a genuine beacon for UK–US regulatory alignment in tech and data, if Britain captures not just the capital but the skills, supply chains and exports that follow. Services trade remains the backbone, finance, insurance, digital. This sector doesn’t thrive on photo-ops; it thrives on regulatory certainty and deep capital markets. Meanwhile, major market-access blockages in steel, aluminium and pharmaceuticals remain unresolved. Quotas agreed in principle are still unworkable in practice. So yes, the relationship endures but endurance without evolution is complacency.
What does Europe think?
Europe remains Britain’s economic operating system. Nearly half of UK goods exports still go to the EU. Resetting ties since the Windsor Framework has improved sentiment, with fewer rows and more quiet co-operation. But this more positive tone needs to translate into faster lorry clearance at Dover.
What businesses want are pragmatic fixes: an SPS deal on agri-food to cut waste and cost, smarter rules of origin so UK-made goods aren’t excluded from value chains and faster conformity assessments, so products move at the pace of the market, not bureaucracy. Meanwhile, Brussels has doubled down on its role as a regulatory superpower; with carbon-border taxes, anti-subsidy probes and digital-market rules. The UK must decide whether to align smartly where it helps exporters or sit in costly divergence with no upside. Pragmatism, not pride, is the winning formula… which so far is working with the USA.
The real story of Britain’s competitiveness isn’t written in summit communiqués but in the lived experience of its businesses. The BCC Competitiveness Report shows the reality: the UK’s share of global services trade has slipped from 8.9 to 7.5 per cent since 2018, and just over one in ten UK firms export at all. Behind those figures lie familiar barriers; energy costs, glacial planning and regulatory uncertainty. What matters now is tangible delivery: faster grid connections, affordable clean energy and planning that moves at investment speed.
A new player on the block
If the US and Europe define Britain’s trading strength, India could be its next great opportunity. The UK has just concluded a successful trade mission – with the Prime Minister leading from the front. The timing couldn’t be better: in 11 months the UK–India FTA will come into effect, and the BCC was part of the delegation that travelled to India to open doors and unlock new opportunities. India’s potential is immense, a booming economy with deep cultural and historic ties to Britain and it could soon grow into a trade relationship on the scale of China’s. But it will never replace our closest partners. The EU and the US will remain the UK’s geopolitical and geographical anchors – the markets that shape our prosperity and standards.
To succeed abroad, we first need to deliver at home the infrastructure, regulation and credibility that make ‘Global Britain’ more than a slogan. That work has already begun. The new UK Trade Strategy gives us the framework to expand, deepen and diversify our commercial relationships, and the government’s decision to relaunch large-scale business and government delegations marks a welcome return to strategic economic diplomacy. The mission to India was an important step forward and I, for one, look forward to the China 2.0 version in 2026.
The fork in the road
Britain has built the soft infrastructure, trade deals, new strategies, political declarations to deliver on the promise of ‘Global Britain’. But now comes the hard part: delivery. That means the unglamorous, day-to-day graft of driving trade and investment and scaling what works, like the BCC’s Trade Accelerator model, which helps firms move from ambition to exports by guiding them through the labyrinth of rules and paperwork that defeats to many.
The US President’s visit proved that the relationship is resilient, but resilience without results is stagnation. When our number one mission is growth and economic renewal, inertia isn’t an option. Doubling down on the US and Europe is a smart strategy, breaking into India is smarter still.
At the French Institute roundtable, one line landed harder than any statistic: Britain isn’t just talking about trade, it’s talking about power. Power to shape our own destiny. Power to make strategy mean something beyond press releases. And that, right now, is what’s missing. For me, the UK can’t keep clapping from the sidelines or mistake optics for strategy; we need to compete pragmatically, with business needs at the heart of policy. Because in 2025, one truth is painfully clear: in international trade, as in geopolitics, spectators don’t win.